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I would like to dedicate this review to the memory of Charles Git-
tings, who initiated the Program to Enforce the Geneva Conventions
(PEGC) in early 2002 and, until his untimely death in July 2010,
provided the international legal community with detailed information
of the many issues discussed in this book.
Once more, Professor Bassiouni demonstrates in this book his
unequivocal, critical vision of the correct interpretation of international
criminal law. It is astounding that he managed to produce, at the same
time, two major treatises on international criminal justice, namely, The
Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on Conﬂicts,
Victimization and Post-Conﬂict Justice.1 Indeed, the eulogies by experts
in the ﬁeld (on the back cover of the book) show that this book is the
primus inter pares on the torture policy of the Bush administration.
The author, in his foreword, refers to former President Bush’s
State of the Union Address in 2006 in which he stated that ‘‘this
administration would determine the character of our country’’ and
correctly draws the conclusion that,
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‘‘if the policy and practices described throughout this book have become the char-
acter of this nation then it is a betrayal of this nation’s character, and those
responsible for it should be investigated and prosecuted if probable cause exists’’.
It is the teacher at his very best, worried about total disregard for
the US Constitution and misinterpretation of obligations under
international law to which the US had committed itself. The author
also shows an incredible mastery of US and international jurispru-
dence as is evident from approximately 900 footnotes.
The book is divided into seven chapters with several useful cross-
references between the chapters. First, an initial chapter on the prohi-
bition of torture under international and US law with an appendix on
legal deﬁnitions. Chapter 2 ‘‘Interrogation Techniques’’ contains very
useful indexes of interrogation methods and detention related abuses
occurring across multiple locations as indeed the torture practices trav-
elled fromGuantanamo toAfghanistan, Iraq and theCIA ‘‘black sites’’.
In addition, he cites a number of military responses to interrogation
techniques by courageous military oﬃcers whose outcry against blatant
abuses were simply overruled by the civilian leadership. Many had to
bear the brunt andwere demoted or, in disgust, tended their resignation.
In this context it should be noted that Professor Bassiouni was forced to
resign by the Bush administration as Independent Expert for the Com-
mission onHumanRights on the human rights situation in Afghanistan
for his candid views on the issues.
One response, listed in this chapter, from Mark Fallon described
water-boarding as ‘‘shocking the conscience.’’ The author laments
that since the 1952 Supreme Court decision in Rochin v. California2
nowhere in the decisions of US courts concerning these more recent
practices have those words been used and he wonders what has
changed since then, ‘‘our collective conscience or its absence’’.3
Chapter 3 discusses the torture-enabling policy and its trickle-down
eﬀects which was meant to insulate high-ranking oﬃcials from criminal
responsibility and by the same token would create the desired socio-
psychological eﬀect on lower ranking oﬃcials, including military per-
sonal and civilian agents. In addition, punishing low ranking oﬃcials,
especially after the scandal in the Abu Ghraib prison, would give the
image that justice was being done. The author ponders that
2 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
3 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture by the Bush Adminis-
tration, Is Anyone Responsible? (Antwerp, Intersentia 2010), 180.
JOHANNES VAN AGGELEN244
‘‘somuchwhich represents such clear violations of our social values and our legal order
could be accomplished by so few in such a short period of time evidences how frail our
legal order is, and perhaps how superﬁcial our social values are, particularly at vul-
nerable times’’.4
Chapter 4, on the practice of ‘‘extraordinary renditions’’ and the use
of ‘‘black sites’’ by the CIA, demonstrates the malicious intent by the
Bush lawyers to exploit a gap in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
which does not extend constitutional protections under the Fourth,
Fifth, Six and Eighth Amendment extraterritorially. Consequently, if
certain acts are committed outside the US and the persons seized and
transferred for torture are not US citizens, then the acts in question are
not crimes in the US. These lacunae in the law were instrumental in
achieving resultswhicharecontrary toboth the spirit and letterof the law
without explicitly contravening the legal instruments governing torture.
The author also considers diplomatic assurances, that the persons
in question would not be subjected to torture, to be a transparent ﬁg
leaf.5 First and foremost the author is concerned that other states
might emulate the way the Bush administration conducted its policy,
especially in view of the fact that the US Annual Reports on Human
Rights Practices, condemn these acts in other countries.
During the consideration of the United States’ reports before the
Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee in
May and July 2006, respectively, these issues were hotly debated.
Despite a meticulous analysis by the committee members, in line with
the one expounded in this book, it was my personal impression that
the delegation would not yield to return to the correct interpretation
of international law. The written replies subsequently given to the
questions by the committee members conﬁrm this position.
Chapter 5 on ‘‘Responsibility: Political, Legal and Ethical Con-
siderations’’, is in my view the central chapter in the book, because
the total absence of political, legal and ethical responsibility were the
motives behind the torture policy. Any careful reader of the book
would come to the conclusion that these were intentionally absent.
The author correctly points out that Congress shirked its political
responsibility by adopting the Detainee Treatment Act (2005) and
the Military Commission Acts (2006 and 2009) precluding the exer-
cise of rights granted by the Supreme Court in Rasul et al. v. Bush,6
4 Ibid., 140.
5 Ibid., 164.
6 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,7 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld8 and Boumediene v. Bush.9
It is really doubtful whether there will be any progress under the
Obama administration as is shown in the case Kiyemba et al. v.
Obama et al.10 where the Supreme Court on 1 March 2010 per curiam
had granted certiorari. The question considered whether a federal
court exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction has the power to order the
release of prisoners held at Guanta´namo where the executive
detention is indeﬁnite and without authorization in law, and where
release into the continental US is the only possible eﬀective remedy.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the US Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Subsequently
on 18 April 2011, the Supreme Court allowed an additional brief, but
denied the writ of certiorari.11
The author describes in detail that the legal responsibility of those
who established and implemented the policy of torture was protected
by all available means. For example he discusses whether the lawyers
in the Oﬃce of Legal Counsel intentionally distorted the applicable
law. In particular John Yoo, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General
of the Department of Justice, in various memoranda stated that the
Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law
did not apply to ‘‘enemy combatants’’. This is because it had no
binding eﬀect on either the President or the military and because it is
not federal law recognized in the Constitution.12
His memorandum dated 14 March 2003 to William Haynes II,
then General Counsel of the Department of Defense remained clas-
siﬁed until 31 March 2008 and makes a mockery of the obligations of
the US under international law. It deals with military interrogations
of alien unlawful combatants held outside of the US. It states that the
7 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8 126 U.S. 2749 (2006).
9 128 S.Ct 2229 (2008).
10 555.F.3rd.1022 D.C. Circuit (2009).
11 (563 U.S. 2011). See further; Al Bihani v. Obama No. 1.05-CV-01312 where the
Circuit Court on 5 January 2010 conﬁrmed an earlier decision by the district court to
deny the right of habeas corpus.
12 See, K. Greenberg and J. Dratel (eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu
Graib (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), in particular Yoo’s Memo
dated 9 January 2002; see also his article The Status of Soldiers and Terrorists under
the Geneva Conventions’, (2004) 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 135–150;
and my reply A Response to John C. Yoo: The Status of Soldiers and Terrorists under
the Geneva Conventions’, (2005), 4 Chinese Journal of International Law, 167–181.
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Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution are not applicable
to alien enemy combatants outside the US; that federal criminal laws
do not apply to properly authorized military interrogations of enemy
combatants; that US obligations under the Convention Against
Torture extend only to conduct that is ‘‘cruel and unusual’’ under the
Eighth Amendment or which ‘‘shocks the conscience’’ under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment. It further states that customary inter-
national law does not impose obligations beyond the Convention
Against Torture and may be overridden by the President who is
advised to claim necessary self-defense in response to possible crim-
inal prosecutions for using abusive and unlawful interrogation tech-
niques.13 Even a layman would wonder whether he had ever studied
US and international law.
The most diﬃcult part to digest is the lackluster attitude by the
American Bar Association (ABA) and State Bar Associations to call
on those legal professionals in the Bush administration aﬃliated with
the Bars and admonish them for their immoral and unethical
behavior. The ABA considered that the 2002 governmental memo-
randa violated the balance of power by attempting to craft an overall
insulation from liability by arguing that the President has the
authority to ignore any law or treaty he believed interfered with the
President’s Article 2 power as Commander-in-Chief.14
It also distanced itself from the Executive Order No.13440 dated
20 July 2007 which authorized the CIA’s ‘‘extraordinary rendition
program’’, claiming that it was inconsistent with US obligations
under Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.15 This executive order
was subsequently revoked by President Obama in Executive Order
No. 13491 dated 22 January 2009.
The author refers to the famous Justice Case16 where 16 defen-
dants were accused of judicial murder and other atrocities committed
by destroying law and justice during the Third Reich. He concludes
13 A detailed report by the US Department of Justice containing a review of the
FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo,
Afghanistan and Iraq was released on 31 May 2008. See my article; The Conse-
quences of Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of
its Victims’, (2009) 42 Case Western Reserve Journal of International law. 21–89.
14 ABA Report to the House of Delegates adopted on 9 August 2004.
15 ABA. Recommendation adopted on 13 and 14 August 2007.
16 United States v Alstoetter et al., 14 Annual Digest of International Law Cases
[1948], 278.
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that unfortunately lessons from the post Nuremberg period were lost
on the Bush administration.17
With respect to medical ethics, Professor. Bassiouni refers to an-
other famous case during the Second World War.18 At Guanta´namo
he singles out in particular the Behavioral Science Consultation Team
where psychiatrists and psychologists were part of a team to prepare
psychological proﬁles for interrogators. This runs counter to the
American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics. He concludes
that medical personnel in Guanta´namo were active participants in the
conspiracy to mistreat detainees in conjunction with members of the
Bush administration.19
His overall assessment leaves a bad taste, because only one
investigation had taken place in the Department of Justice concerning
Yoo’s memo, also covering the conduct of signatories such as Jay
Bybee. The investigation resulted in their exoneration for profes-
sional misconduct, with the legal memoranda considered to be ‘‘poor
judgment’’.
Chapter 6 surveys the ﬁrst 18 months of the Obama Administra-
tion. The initial three executive orders signed on 22 January 2009 did
raise many expectations. It halted for a period of six months the trials
before military commissions, promised to close down Guanta´namo
within a year and also provided for lawful interrogations of ‘‘enemy
combatants’’ in accordance with international humanitarian law. As
an indication of the changed emphasis, the new Attorney General,
Mr. Holder proposed to move Guanta´namo prosecutions from mil-
itary commissions to civilian criminal trials which would entail the
application of constitutional rights.
However, the situation remains confused as he later announced
that ﬁve detainees would be tried by military commissions, an option
retained in a preliminary report published in July 2009 by the Obama
administration.20 Politics also interfered. Senator Graham introduced
an amendment to Human Rights Bill 2487 preventing terrorist sus-
pects from entering the United States and calling for military trials at
17 Bassiouni (n. 3), 220.
18 The Nazi Doctors’ Case’ United States v Brandt, Trials of War Criminals before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Volume 2
(1947), 171–297.
19 Bassiouni (n. 3), 234.
20 Detention Policy Task Force, Memorandum to the Attorney General and
Secretary of Defence, Preliminary Report dated 20 July 2009.
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Guanta´namo.21 In addition, Secretary of Defense Gates lifted the
suspension on new charges in military commissions which was issued
pending review of the status of each detainee in accordance with
Executive Order No. 13492. The ﬁnal report of the Review Task
Force was issued on 22 January 2010 with the following dispositions:
126 detainees were approved for transfer outside United States; 44
detainees were referred for prosecution either in federal court or in
military commissions and 36 of these detainees remain the subject of
active cases or investigations and 48 detainees were determined to be
too dangerous to be transferred, but not feasible for prosecution and
were approved for continued detention under the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (2001).22
In a statement before the House Armed Services Committee,
Hearing on Detainees, on 17 March 2011, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, under reference to Executive Order No. 13567,23 stated that
President Obama and his administration disagreed with the restric-
tions Congress had imposed on transferring Guanta´namo detainees
to the United States for the purpose of prosecuting them in federal
courts. ‘‘Bringing detainees to justice is an essential part of our
arsenal in the war against Al Qaeda and its aﬃliates, and the exec-
utive branch must be able to draw on all aspects of our justice system,
including article III courts’’.24 Nevertheless, section 10 (d) of the
Executive Order states ‘‘nothing in this order, and no determination
made under this order, shall be construed as grounds for release of
detainees covered by this order into the United States’’. This squarely
contradicts what the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated in expla-
nation of the order.
The periodic review established by this order follows the line of the
Administrative Review Boards and the Combat Status Review Tri-
bunal which periodically reviewed detainees between 2002 and 2009
as a consequence of which 540 detainees were transferred to other
countries. The author makes a strong point when he criticizes
21 Amendment to Human Rights Bill 2487 dated 5 November 2009.
22 Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, Assistant to the President for the National Security Aﬀairs and
the Counsel to the President dated 22 January 2010.
23 Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force’ dated 7 March 2011.
24 See, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?Speechid=1548 accessed 1
March 2012.
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President Obama for opposing litigation by former Guantanamo
detainees in pursuit of legal remedies under US law for having been
subjected to torture and other degrading and inhumane treatment.25
It is a bad omen that Judge Hogan determined a class action by
105 former detainees to be ‘‘moot’’ in April 2010.26 Regional human
rights courts are in the process of creating a large amount of juris-
prudence on this subject matter and opposing litigation is in oppo-
sition to the accepted maxim, ‘‘where there is a right, there is a
remedy’’. The chapter closes with Appendix 5, containing the status
of cases before the military commissions up to July 2010.
In his ﬁnal assessment in Chapter 7 the author calls for research
into why Congress failed to exercise its constitutional duty of ‘‘checks
and balances,’’ why the judiciary and in particular the Supreme Court
shied away from the traditional role of guaranteeing due process of
law and why Bar and Medical Associations remained silent.27 The
declaration by former chief of staﬀ to then Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Colonel Wilkerson, cited at the end of the book, shows that
he and others, who abided by their professional obligations, may be a
shining path in the struggle back to the rule of law and due process in
the American system.28 It takes courage to confront the American
administration as the case of Judge Balthazar Garzon proves. In
January 2010 he initiated a criminal investigation against six mem-
bers of the Bush administration based on the principle of universal
jurisdiction (Gonzales, Addington, Haynes, Bybee, Yoo and Flani-
gan). Subsequently, the US pressured Spain over CIA rendition
practices and Guanta´namo torture claiming that eventual prosecu-
tions would have an enormous impact on bilateral relations.
The book gives a complete picture, in addition to the appendices it
details the key actors in the torture policy, provides a useful timeline
and a 24 page table of authorities containing books, journal articles,
newspaper articles and press releases, US government documents,
and US and non-US case law.
25 Bassiouni (n. 3), 258.
26 In Re: Petitioners Seeking Habeas Corpus Relief in Relation to get prior
Detention at Guanta´namo, (2010) WL 1252448 (DDC 2010).
27 Bassiouni (n. 3), 271.
28 Declaration of Colonel Wilkerson, 24 March 2010, in Adel Hassan Hamad v.
George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Donald Rumsfeld, Jay Hood and Brice Gyurisko,
CV05-1009 JDB (D.D.C. 2010).
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The book, ﬁnally, is an outstanding tool for use in international
criminal law courses, academic study, but also should be a guide to
practicing lawyers in the US and elsewhere.
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